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Last November, the Syrian province of al-Suwaida
was again in the news Ð Arab and European news,
that is. The Syrian media remained silent on the mat-
ter. The province, better known as ÔDruze MountainÕ,
is also called ÔHawran MountainÕ and ÔArab Moun-
tainÕ, the name confusion already hinting at the com-
plicated identity of its inhabitants. It was, once again,
surrounded by army troops. What had happened?
Identity, Power
and Piety
The Druzes in Syria
The Druze Mountain has historically been a
frontier region, a major contact zone be-
tween steppe and agricultural lands. In No-
vember, in incidents reminiscent of a centu-
ry ago, local Bedouins, hard pressed by
three years of drought, had led their herds
of sheep and goats into the small-scale fruit
plantations (b u s t a ns) for which the province
of al-Suwaida, primary wine producing re-
gion of Syria, is known. The Druze inhabi-
tants, outraged by the imminent destruc-
tion of their plantations, drove out the
flocks and attacked the Bedouins. The ensu-
ing skirmishes cost the lives of 5 to 10 peo-
ple, all Druzes, and injured 150 to 200 per-
sons, mostly Druzes. The fatalities and in-
juries can be ascribed to the great number
of illegal firearms in the hands of the
Bedouins. As always, when conflict arose in
the area, the main road linking al-Suwaida,
capital of the province, with Damascus was
closed. The province sent a petition to
Bashar al-Asad, the young president of
Syria, ensuring him of their support and ask-
ing for protection. Druze university students
demonstrated in Damascus, demanding
government support for their people. Presi-
dent Bashar al-Asad personally called
s h a y k ha l-ca q l (highest Druze religious office
holder), Husain a l - J a r b uca, on the phone.
Discourse on the Druzes
This is the gist of the incident, as reported
in a number of news articles and by word of
mouth in Syria, an obvious conflict between
Ôdesert and sownÕ. The stories woven into
the incident are of major interest. The first
articles, for example, reported that Be-
douins had seized Druze land and tried to
build a mosque there; other stories purport-
ed that it all began with Christians, who had
been living for a long time in the mountain.
The latter stories held that that the Druzes
only came to defend the Christians against
the Bedouins. Virtually all observers were
awaiting a new ÔDruze revoltÕ against the
Syrian government (only six months after
the death of Hafiz al-Asad). One news report
stated that the governorÕs office was burnt
down (the fact is that it was invaded by
Druze youths and some windows were bro-
k e n ) .
These stories hint at the discourse on the
Druzes, both by others and by the Druzes
themselves. First, virtually any event involv-
ing the province is automatically given a
touch of sectarianism, hence the story of a
mosque amidst a conflict over land use.
Then, on the part of the Druzes, an apolo-
getic discourse evolved early on, which rep-
resented them as protectors of the Christian
minority in their territory. Sultan al-Atrash,
the Druze leader of the anti-colonial ÔGreat
RevoltÕ against the French in the 1920s, for
example, chose as his constant companion
and signer of international petitions a Chris-
tian from his territory Ð a political strategy
to defuse European sectarian suspicion.
Governments, starting with the Ottomans,
and including the French Mandate and Syri-
an president Shishakli in the 1950s, had to
deal with Druze revolts, all of which consti-
tute a Ôhistory of rebellionÕ from which the
Druzes continue to derive political capital
and which they evoke whenever a crisis
erupts. In particular, the revolt against the
French under Druze hero Sultan al-Atrash
has been skilfully utilized by the Druzes to
construct an image of selfless patriotism for
t h e m s e l v e s .1
The difference of the Druzes translates it-
self into the many names of their territory.
Jabal Druze is the oldest designation. Yet,
the sectarian content of the name is an issue
in present-day Syria, where t aci f i y y a ( s e c t a r i-
anism) is one of the greatest taboos, and so
the more geographical term ÔMountain of
the HawranÕ is preferred. The politically cor-
rect term is Ôprovince of al-SuwaidaÕ, and the
term Jabal a l -cA r a b (i.e. mountain of the
Arabs, stressing the Arabism of the Druzes)
was bestowed upon the area by urban na-
tionalists for Druze achievements against
French colonialism. The Druzes have clout
in Syria. Not all provinces receive personal
phone calls from the president in times of
c r i s i s .
The role of Sultan al-Atrash
The Syrian Druzes can be seen as the most
ÔsecularÕ of the Druze groupings in the Mid-
dle East. Unlike Lebanon, where sectarian-
ism is built into the political system and
where the Druzes are a party-turned-militia-
turned-party, and Israel, where the state put
them into the position of a special and non-
Arab minority, in Syria the Druzes are repre-
sented in the political system as a m u h a f a z a,
a province. As such, al-Suwaida sends six
deputies to parliament, and provides one
minister and one member of the Ba't h
partyÕs Regional Command. The long peri-
ods of virtual autonomy that the Druzes en-
joyed in Syria, the powerful role as a nation-
alist symbol assumed by Druze hero Sultan
al-Atrash, and the secular political discourse
of the present state with its taboo on sectar-
ianism, have encouraged the traditional
separation of religious and secular spheres
within Druzedom.
Yet it was their religious leader, the s h a y k h
a l-ca q l, with whom Bashar al-Asad reported-
ly spoke, not the (non-Druze) governor of
the province, nor the local secretary of the
Ba't h party. Until the death of Sultan al-
Atrash in 1982, the presidentÕs phone call, to
be understood as a symbol for who is repre-
senting the Druze community, would
doubtlessly have been to the latter, a world-
ly leader. Underneath the official represen-
tation as a province lurks the unofficial rep-
resentation as a religious/ethnic communi-
ty. This raises the question of power sharing
within the Druze community itself, and the
relation between religious and secular
spheres within Druzedom.
The separation of the spheres
The separation of the religious and the
secular has traditionally been expressed in
the terms denoting elites. The worldly
sheikh was called s h a y k h j u d h m a n i ( c o r p o-
real sheikh), the religious sheikh was being
called s h a y k hr u h i (spiritual sheikh). While all
older men (traditionally above the age of
40) are expected to Ôenter the religionÕ by
shaving their heads, donning religious garb
and attending prayers, only a select group
of religious sheikhs maintain a reputation
within the community. A religious sheikh,
also called j u w w a y y i d (noble, high-minded)
establishes himself either by the path of
piety and holiness, without this requiring
him to know much about the mysteries of
the religion, or through expert knowledge
of the holy scriptures. The highest rank is
held by those able to combine both holiness
and knowledge. They lead an ascetic life,
nourishing themselves exclusively from the
pure products of nature, which they culti-
vate themselves. Their task is to channel di-
vine blessings to the community through
their rituals and meditation, undertaken in
the k h a l w a, a sacred place of congregation
outside the village and thus removed from
the political factionalism of the secular
sphere. The spiritual sheikhs are absolutely
forbidden to become involved in politics.
The office of the shaykh
a l-c a q l
In view of the rejection of worldly power
in the sphere of spirituality, the nature of
the office of s h a y k h a l-ca q l is somewhat am-
biguous. The s h a y k h a l-ca q ls among the Syr-
ian Druzes have historically been derived
from three families: the Hajari, the J a r b uca,
and the Hannawi. The candidates have been
chosen from among these families Ôfollow-
ing Druze traditions and religious ritesÕ, a
privilege they defended vigorously against
critics from within and the state from with-
out. In Syria, the s h a y k h a l-ca q ls have been
much less dependent on powerful families
than in Lebanon, where the families of the
Junblat and the Arslan nominate their own
candidates. The office of the s h a y k h a l-ca q l
was in all probability invented by the state,
i.e. the Ottomans, who wanted a religious
spokesman for the Druze community. The
first recorded incident of a Syrian s h a y k h a l-
ca q l, al-Hajari, representing the community
v i s -  - v i s the state occurred in the sectarian
crisis of 1860.
TodayÕs s h a y k h a l-ca q l, Husain J a r b uca,
was flown back from Venezuela, which is
home to a large Druze emigrant communi-
ty, when the previous office holder in his
family died. Since he had been out of the
country for years, the familyÕs choice creat-
ed a stir in the community and gave rise to
rumours about his moral and spiritual qual-
ities. He turned out to be politically savvy,
profiting from the power vacuum left by
the death of Sultan al-Atrash and monopo-
lizing power within the community. This he
achieved by reviving and expanding an old
Druze ÔconventÕ, Ain al-Zaman, into a reli-
gious centre.
When in 1991 the Egyptian paper a l -
Ahram a l - M a sa'i published a fatwa that de-
nied the Druze faith its place within Islam,
the confident s h a y k h a l-ca q l J a r b uca d i s-
patched a letter to Egyptian president Husni
Mubarak, expressing his hope that Ôthe
mufti of Egypt did not know what he was
doing by issuing this fatwa. For, if he knew
what he was doing, it would be a catastro-
phe for Islam.Õ The presidentÕs and the
muftiÕs offices looked into the matter.
EgyptÕs president wrote back to the Druzes,
stating that the mufti, Dr Tantawi, denied
ever having issued such a fatwa. The news-
paper printed the explanation that the
fatwa in question stemmed from 1936, and
that the current mufti of Egypt had nothing
to do with it.
O u t l o o k
Since the separation of spheres has been
upheld longer in Syria than in the other
Druze communities, arguably until the
death of Sultan al-Atrash in 1982, the arcane
discipline has been strong and reform
movements within the religious sphere
have been weak. In conversations, a handful
of young men are sometimes mentioned
who reportedly Ôwanted to writeÕ, but were
discouraged in the end. The Syrian Druzes
learned about Lebanese Abdallah NajjarÕs
controversial revelations of the faith largely
through Sami MakarimÕs more moderate
Ôcounter-bookÕ, and through his lecture vis-
i t s .2
There are signs, however, of a new debate
on the Druze faith in Syria. One book in five
volumes about the Unitarians, a term the
Druzes prefer, has already been published.
Another Syrian book project, treating the
Unitarians as Gnostics, was presented at a
recent meeting of the American Druze Soci-
ety. The Syrian Druzes are beginning to de-
bate their faith, further breaking down the
separation of the spheres which, for better
or worse, likens them to the other Druze
communities in the Middle East. u
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